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Our daily experiences are incidentally and rapidly encoded as episodic memories. Episodic
memories consist of numerous associations (e.g., who gave what to whom where and
when) that can be expressed ﬂexibly in new situations. Key features of episodic memory
are speed of encoding, its associative nature, and its representational ﬂexibility. Another
deﬁning feature of human episodic memory has been consciousness of encoding/retrieval.
Here, we show that humans can rapidly form associations between subliminal words and
minutes later retrieve these associations even if retrieval words were conceptually related
to, but different from encoding words. Because encoding words were presented sub-
liminally, associative encoding, and retrieval were unconscious. Unconscious association
formation and retrieval were dependent on a preceding understanding of task principles.
We conclude that key computations underlying episodic memory – rapid encoding and
ﬂexible expression of associations – can operate outside consciousness.
Keywords: unconscious, non-conscious, implicit, non-declarative, analogical thinking, episodic memory, associa-
tive learning, flexibility
INTRODUCTION
Experiences are incidentally encoded from moment to moment
and stored in episodicmemory, fromwhere they canbe retrieved as
awhole or in elements. Episodes consist of perceptual impressions,
conceptual aspects as well as temporal and spatial information that
are rapidly associated in memory (Sutherland and Rudy, 1989;
Eichenbaum et al., 1996; Henke et al., 1997, 1999; O’Reilly and
Rudy, 2000; Mayes et al., 2007). Accordingly, episodic memory
has been deﬁned as the memory for personal experiences in time
and place (Tulving, 1985, 2001). Furthermore, episodic memory
is also thought to depend on autonoetic consciousness (Tulving,
1985, 2001). Autonoetic consciousness refers to a person’s aware-
ness of his existence and identity in subjective time extending
from the personal past through the present to the future. The
term autonoetic refers to the consciousness that allows us to be
aware of the subjective time in which events happen. Here, we
asked whether consciousness is a necessary condition for rapid
associative encoding and the ﬂexible retrieval of the formed asso-
ciations.We hypothesized that these key computations underlying
episodic memory might be operating even in situations where one
is unaware of encoding and retrieval.
It is debated whether consciousness is a necessary condition of
episodic memory formation (Henke et al., 2003; Degonda et al.,
2005; Smith and Squire, 2005; Greene, 2007; Hannula et al., 2007;
Henke, 2010). This debate has been partly nourished by ﬁnd-
ings from studies with subliminal face–word pairs presented for
unconscious associative encoding (Henke et al., 2003; Degonda
et al., 2005). In these studies, face–word pairs were presented for
17 ms preceded and followed by pattern masks to avoid stimu-
lus awareness (Henke et al., 2003; Degonda et al., 2005). When
participants were later prompted by supraliminal presentations of
the encoding faces, their behavior in a forced-choice test indicated
that they had associated the subliminal faces to the subliminal
words. The newly formed associations between subliminal faces
and words were retained over at least 3 min indicating long-
term rather than short-term storage. Because the computations
required by this task are reminiscent of episodic memory,we spec-
ulated that new episodic memories could be formed and retained
even without consciousness of encoding (Henke, 2010). One such
computational characteristic that is typical for episodic memory is
association formation (McClelland et al., 1995; Henke et al., 1999;
O’Reilly and Rudy, 2000, 2001; Norman and O’Reilly, 2003). Our
previous studies suggested the feasibility of unconscious associa-
tion formation (Henke et al., 2003; Degonda et al., 2005). Another
computational characteristic that is typical for episodic memory
formation and that was operational in our subliminal studies
(Henke et al., 2003; Degonda et al., 2005) is one-trial encoding
(Squire, 1992; Treves and Rolls, 1994; O’Reilly and Rudy, 2000;
Norman and O’Reilly, 2003).
A further characteristic of episodic memories is their composi-
tionality and representational ﬂexibility (Cohen and Eichenbaum,
1993). Compositionality refers to the mental representation of
both the entire memory and its individual elements. The elements
of episodic memories are not blended into an inseparable rep-
resentation but are accessible individually and also in relation
to each other. The representation of episodic memories is con-
sidered ﬂexible because elements and their associations can be
reactivated through many routes. Even an aspect of an event that
is only remotely related to an encoding episode may reactivate
the entire memorized episode. This ﬂexibility allows for a test
format that differs from the used study format. Such a represen-
tational ﬂexibility also permits the inferential and analogical use
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of episodic memories in new situations (Cohen and Eichenbaum,
1993; Eichenbaum et al., 1996; Mayes et al., 2007).
Our previous experiments on subliminal encoding (Henke
et al., 2003; Degonda et al., 2005) had not addressed composition-
ality and representational ﬂexibility sufﬁciently. Therefore,we con-
ducted the current experiments. It is generally assumed that only
conscious episodic encoding would yield ﬂexible memory repre-
sentations. Unconscious encoding, however, is generally expected
to yield rigid memory representations, in which the elements are
blended into inseparable representations. Such rigid representa-
tions can only be accessed if the retrieval and encoding situations
match (e.g., perceptual priming; Squire, 1992; Cohen and Eichen-
baum, 1993; Reber et al., 1996; Mayes et al., 2007). According
to more recent views (Reder et al., 2009; Henke, 2010), process-
ing modes and computational characteristics underlying memory
formation do not map onto levels of consciousness of encoding.
Accordingly, ﬂexible memory representations may also originate
from unconscious encoding of information. In the current experi-
ments we tested whether unconsciously encoded word pairs can be
reactivated upon confrontation with semantically analogous word
pairs. Because encoding and retrieval word pairs were not identi-
cal, a successful retrieval would speak to the ﬂexibility of memory
representations. To obtain fully unconscious memory representa-
tions, encoding word pairs were presented invisible for only 17 ms
ﬂanked by pattern masks (Figure 1; Henke et al., 2003; Degonda
et al., 2005).
Because the current experiments are challenging in terms of
unconscious computations, we assumed that they would proﬁt
from an initial conscious understanding of the task structure.
Recent studies have demonstrated that the processing of sub-
liminal stimuli is facilitated by the previous built-up of speciﬁc
FIGURE 1 | Masking paradigm. Illustrated is one subliminal encoding trial
consisting of the 12-fold presentation of the word pair “table–car.”
Presentation duration was 17ms.Word pairs were masked by visual noise
patterns. An attention task was included in the masking sequence to
ensure that participants visually ﬁxated the center of the screen. For the
attention task, participants indicated by button press whether a horizontal
or a vertical bar was occurring in place of the ﬁxation cross. The probability
of occurrence was 5/6 for a ﬁxation cross and 1/6 for a bar.
task expectations and the sensitization of the task-speciﬁc pro-
cessing pathways (Naccache and Dehaene, 2001; Abrams et al.,
2002; Kunde et al., 2003; Dehaene et al., 2006; Eckstein and Per-
rig, 2007; Kiesel et al., 2009; Martens and Kiefer, 2009; Kiefer and
Martens, 2010). Therefore, we applied the same memory task (yet
with different stimuli) with suprathreshold stimulus presentations
for conscious inspection in order to examine potential inﬂuences
of conscious task understanding on the subsequent unconscious
processing of subliminal word pairs. To uncover effects of an initial
task understanding in the ﬁrst experiment, the suprathreshold task
version preceded (half of participants) or followed (other half of
participants) the task version with subliminal stimulus presenta-
tions. Furthermore,we exploredwhether effects of subliminal pro-
cessing could be enhanced by repeating the subliminal presenta-
tion of a word pair. Accordingly, word pairs in the ﬁrst experiment
were either presented in one or nine subliminal encoding trials.
EXPERIMENT 1
That the use of analogies requires ﬂexible memory expression
can be exempliﬁed by the following tale: The planets orbiting the
sun inspired Niels Bohr to formulate his model on how electrons
revolve around the atomic nucleus. The detection of analogies
between past and current experiences may inspire inferential
thinking and problem-solving (Dunbar and Blanchette, 2001).
Experiment 1 required a ﬂexible expression of memories because
retrieval cuesweremere analogs of encoding stimuli.We presented
subliminal pairs of unrelated words (e.g., “table–car”; Figure 2)
for unconscious encoding. For unconscious retrieval,we presented
analogousword pairs (e.g.,“desk–bus”) with suprathreshold dura-
tion allowing the conscious inspection of words. Our aim was
to ﬁnd out whether analogs are sufﬁcient to reactivate origi-
nally formed unconscious memories of word pairs. Although the
analogs were presented with suprathreshold duration, the hypoth-
esized processes of analogy detection and memory reactivation
must runoutside consciousness because encodingwordswere sub-
liminal. To reveal unconscious memory expression, we instructed
participants to judge the goodness of the semantic ﬁt between
words in an analog (Silberman et al., 2005). In the control condi-
tion, the suprathreshold words in a pair were semantically related
to two words that each came from a different encoding word
pair. When for example the subliminal word pairs “table–car”
and “dollar–sheep” were given for encoding, the suprathreshold
word pair “counter–goat” was given for retrieval in the control
condition (Figure 2). Therefore, we refer to these word pairs as
“broken analogs.” Words in broken analogs may act as retrieval
cues for previously encoded single words but not associations. We
assumed that the processing of the subliminal words, like “table–
car,” would subjectively decrease the semantic distance between
words in analogs, like “desk–bus.” Accordingly, we expected a
larger number of ﬁt answers to analogs than broken analogs.
This result would indicate a ﬂexible expression of unconsciously
formed associations.
Experiment 1 contained two subliminal experimental versions:
in one experimental version, subliminal word pairs were presented
in one encoding trial, and in the other experimental version, sub-
liminal word pairs were presented in nine encoding trials to push
effects of unconscious processing. One encoding trial comprised
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FIGURE 2 | Design of experiment 1. Experiment 1 contained three
experimental versions that differed with regard to the encoding mode.
Depending on the experimental version, encoding word pairs were presented
in one supraliminal encoding trial, in one subliminal encoding trial (illustrated
by the gray oval), or in nine subliminal encoding trials. During subliminal
presentations, participants performed an attention task. The incidental
encoding instruction for suprathreshold word pairs was to indicate whether
the two words of a pair ﬁt together semantically or not (Fit together task). In
each of the three experimental versions, the encoding run was separated by a
5-min break from the retrieval run. The design of the retrieval run was identical
in the three experimental versions. Retrieval word pairs were presented
suprathreshold. The indirect retrieval task required participants to indicate
whether the two words of a pair ﬁt together semantically or not (Fit together
task).
12 masked 17 ms-presentations of a word pair within a 6-s time
window (Figure 1; Henke et al., 2003; Degonda et al., 2005).
Furthermore, a suprathreshold version of the experiment was
applied to participants either preceding the two subliminal exper-
imental versions or not. This manipulation should reveal whether
an initial versus later conscious apprehension of task principles
would facilitate the ensuing unconscious processing of subliminal
word pairs (Martens and Kiefer, 2009; Kiefer and Martens, 2010).
In the suprathreshold version of the experiment, both encoding
and retrieval word pairs were presented for conscious inspec-
tion. Importantly, words presented in the suprathreshold version
differed from words presented in the subliminal versions of the
experiment. Hence, supraliminal words and word pairs could not
prime subliminal words and word pairs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-ﬁve healthy students (18 women and 17 men; age range:
18–30 years;M = 25.02, SD= 2.93) participated for remuneration
or course credit. They were normally sighted, native German
speakers, reported no current or past neurological or psychiatric
disorders, and denied taking prescription or illegal drugs. Par-
ticipants were kept naïve as to the purpose of the experiment
(subliminal perception and memory). They were misinformed
that the subliminal experimental versions were about attention
(encoding part) and language (retrieval part). The local ethics
committee approved the study.
Apparatus and materials
Stimuli were presented with an LCD video beamer with a refresh
rate of 60 Hz. The stimulated visual ﬁeld was 17˚ wide and 11˚
high. Stimuli consisted of 96 triplets of subordinate terms that
belong to the same superordinate category (e.g., table, desk, and
counter). We combined words from different categories to form
wordpairs for encoding. These encodingwordswere not presented
for retrieval. Instead, retrieval words used in the experimental
condition were semantic neighbors of words combined in an
encoding pair (encoding: table–car; retrieval: desk–bus). We refer
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to the retrieval word pairs used in the experimental condition
as “analogs.” Retrieval words used in the control condition were
semantic neighbors of words presented in two different encod-
ing word pairs (encoding: table–car. . . dollar–sheep; retrieval:
counter–goat; Silberman et al., 2005). Therefore, we refer to the
retrieval word pairs presented in the control condition as “broken
analogs.” We needed the 96 triplets (three versions of a concept)
to construct three lists of 16 word–word combinations. Three ver-
sions of a concept were needed because each list contained 16
encoding word pairs, 16 analogs, and 16 broken analogs. The three
lists were used for the three versions of the experiment (see below
“Design and Procedure”).
To distribute effects of a potential stimulus bias over condi-
tions, we counterbalanced stimuli across conditions: encoding
word pairs were rearranged such that analogs appeared as bro-
ken analogs and vice versa. We included a baseline condition in
anticipation of later experimentation with neuroimaging. For this
baseline condition, we created 96 pairs of consonant strings (e.g.,
brtmzh–nvpthw), of which 16 pairs were used in the encoding
part and 16 in the retrieval part of each of the three experimental
versions. Sixty further words were used as targets and distracters
in a direct test of conscious awareness of subliminal stimuli. This
awareness test was carried out at the end of the session.
Masking paradigm
We used the masking technique of Degonda et al. (2005) to present
the encoding word pairs subliminally. A subliminal word pair was
ﬂashed 12 times for 17 ms during a subliminal trial of 6 s. The
17-ms-presentations were ﬂanked by pattern masks to avoid the
visibility of the word pair. Masks consisted of random patterns
of black and white pixels (800 × 600). During subliminal trials,
participants performed an attention task that ensured that their
attention was focused and maintained. For this attention task, we
presented ﬁxation crosses, horizontal and vertical bars intermixed
with word pairs and masks embedded in a 6-s subliminal trial
(Figure 1). A ﬁxation cross or a bar was presented once per sec-
ond in all subliminal trials. Once in 12 presentations or within
one subliminal trial, the ﬁxation cross was randomly replaced by
a vertical or horizontal bar. Participants’ task was to indicate the
bar’s orientation by button press. The left-hand word of a sublim-
inal word pair appeared to the left of a subsequently or previously
ﬂashed ﬁxation cross/bar and the right-hand word appeared to
its right, which constitutes a bilateral simultaneous hemispheric
stimulation. The presentation durations were 17 ms for stimuli
(S), 183 ms for masks (M ), and 233 ms for ﬁxation crosses/bars
(F). One subliminal trial (Figure 1) consisted of the following
image sequence: F-M -S-M -M -S-M -F-M -S-M -M -S-M -F-
M -S-M -M -S-M -F-M -S-M -M -S-M -F-M -S-M -M -S-M -F-M -
S-M -M -S-M. To conceal the purpose of the masking sequence,
participants were told that the masking sequence measured
attention alone.
Design and procedure
Participants were seated in the darkened laboratory and took a
health questionnaire at the beginning of the session. Their heads
were positioned on a chin rest. Before the experiment started,
they underwent practice trials to get familiar with the tasks and
procedures. There were three versions of the experiment. Word
pairs were subliminal in two versions and suprathreshold in one
version. Each participant took all three versions of the experiment.
The order in which experimental versions were given to partici-
pants was varied between participants. Half the participants took
the suprathreshold version before the two subliminal versions.
This order was reversed for the other half of participants. We
hypothesized that the task structure would become apparent to
participants and would facilitate the ensuing processing of the
subliminal word pairs, if the suprathreshold version was taken at
the beginning of the session.
Each experimental version consisted of an encoding part, fol-
lowed by 5 min of quiet rest. Then, a retrieval part followed. In the
suprathreshold version, the 16 encodingword pairs were presented
above threshold to assess the incidental encoding of consciously
apprehended word pairs. In one suprathreshold encoding trial,
one word pair (e.g., table–car) was shown for 3.5 s, followed by
a 1-s inter-stimulus interval. The encoding task was to judge the
semantic relatedness of the two words in an encoding pair (yes or
no) immediately upon its occurrence. Participants were instructed
in the following way: “You will be presented with a sequence of
word pairs. Your task is to decide whether the two words in a pair
ﬁt together or not regarding their meaning. If you think that the
two words in a pair ﬁt together, push the left mouse button. If
you think the two words do not ﬁt together, push the right mouse
button. [. . .] The words in a pair may not ﬁt together at ﬁrst
glance. But there may be more remote associations between the
two words. Really close associations as present in “needle–yarn”
will not occur. An example word pair is “cow–grill.”Although cow
appears not associated to grill, cow and grill may still be judged as
ﬁtting together because beef is a popular meat used for barbecues.
For some words in pairs you will ﬁnd associations easily. Other
words may be more remotely associated. Please try to establish
a criterion for yourself that allows you to give an approximately
equal number of ﬁt and don’t ﬁt answers.”The criterion for decid-
ing about the semantic ﬁt between words was established during
the practice trials given at the beginning of the session. In the
baseline condition, where consonant strings were presented, par-
ticipants judged the visual relatedness of the two consonant strings
in a pair (yes or no). For both conditions (i.e., for semantic and
visual relatedness judgments), we asked participants to use a loose
response criterion in order to approximate 50% ﬁt answers. In the
two subliminal experimental versions, encoding word pairs were
either presented in one subliminal encoding trial (12 masked pre-
sentations of the same word pair in a 6-s time window, Figure 1),
or in nine temporally dispersed subliminal encoding trials (nine
times a 6-s time window entailing 12 masked presentations of the
same word pair). The nine subliminal encoding trials of a given
word pair (e.g., “rain–screw,” Figure 2) were evenly distributed
over the whole encoding run. Hence, the nine subliminal encoding
trials of a word pair were intervened by subliminal presentations
of other word pairs (e.g., “coffee–tango”) used in the condition
and by subliminal presentations of pairs of letter strings used in
the baseline condition (Figure 2). Only encoding word pairs, but
not the pairs of letter strings, were presented nine times. Conse-
quently, the encoding runs of the three experimental versions had
different lengths: the suprathreshold encoding run lasted 2.4 min,
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the subliminal encoding run that included one encoding trial per
word pair lasted 3.2 min, and the subliminal encoding run that
included nine encoding trials per word pair lasted 16 min. To alle-
viate tiring, the 16-min run was subdivided into three parts with
1 min breaks in between.
The retrieval parts were the same for all three experimental
versions. Retrieval word pairs were presented above threshold
for 3.5 s, followed by a 1-s inter-stimulus interval. The indirect
retrieval task was the same task as given for conscious encoding,
namely to judge the semantic relatedness of words in a pair (yes
or no). In the baseline condition, where consonant strings were
presented, participants judged the visual relatedness of the two
strings in a pair (yes or no).
For encoding and retrieval, word pairs and letter strings were
presented in separate blocks of four stimuli, arranged by con-
dition. Hence, the 16 stimuli of each condition were presented in
four blocks of four stimuli. Stimulus pairs were randomly assigned
to blocks and this assignment differed between participants. For
the experimental version with nine encoding trials per word pair,
word pairs were randomly assigned to the four blocks of the initial
presentation and then reassigned randomly to the following four
blocks for each of the following repetitions. The order of blocks
was varied between participants to balance sequence effects. We
counterbalanced stimuli across conditions.
Awareness test
Following the above experiment, participants were interviewed
on whether they had suspected or even perceived subliminal
stimuli or perceptual fragments thereof (see Post-Experimental
Interview in Appendix). Then, they were informed about the fact
that there were subliminal stimuli embedded in the attention task.
Finally, participants underwent the awareness test, where stimulus
discriminability was assessed objectively.
Standard procedure to establish a claim of unconscious pro-
cessing is to demonstrate effects of subliminal stimuli in indirect
tests (as used in the experiment) in the absence of signiﬁcant dis-
criminability of subliminal stimuli in an intentional encoding and
direct retrieval test (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984). Our direct test
of awareness consisted of 30 trials. In each trial, we presented one
subliminal word at the same screen location where the right-hand
word in the word pairs presented in the experiment had appeared.
Thus, due to participants’ central visual ﬁxation, we stimulated
their left (language-dominant) hemisphere. The reason why we
presented one instead of two words (as in the experiment) was to
facilitate subliminal processing by reducing the amount of simul-
taneously displayed information and by getting rid of the effect of
inter-hemispheric inhibition on the simultaneouswordprocessing
within each hemisphere (Cook, 1986). We ﬁgured that conscious
awareness of subliminal word pairs could be safely excluded in
the experiment if even single words could not be discerned in the
ﬁnal awareness test. Apart from presenting only one instead of
two words, the presentation procedure for a subliminal stimulus
was the same as in the experiment: each word was presented in
one subliminal trial – i.e., in 12 ﬂashes of 17 ms each, ﬂanked by
pattern masks and intermixed with ﬁxation crosses or bars for
the attention task. Immediately following the presentation of one
word in one subliminal trial, participants chose between a target
and a distracter word (forced-choice test). The target word was
the word presented in the subliminal trial. The distracter word
was a new word that was unrelated to the target. Participants were
instructed to select the word that they thought was subliminally
presented. Our standard for claiming the absence of conscious
perception of subliminal words was a non-signiﬁcant (p > 0.200)
group analysis (t -test) of number of correct choices per partici-
pant. Even if this group analysis yielded a non-signiﬁcant result,
we still excluded participants from the analysis of the data from the
experiment, if they had reached more than 20 out of potentially 30
correct choices in this awareness test. Twenty correct choices cor-
responded to the 5% cut-off of the chance distribution of correct
choices. Moreover, we regressed the discrimination performance
achieved in the awareness test onto the performance achieved in
the indirect retrieval test applied in the experiment to see whether
unconscious processing persists even if potential contributions by
conscious stimulus discrimination are regressed out (Greenwald
et al., 1995).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
No participant reported to have suspected or perceived subliminal
stimuli during the experiment. The direct test of stimulus aware-
ness indicated a chance group performance, M correct = 48.5%,
SDcorrect = 9.2%; t (34)=−0.977, p = 0.336, r2 = 0.026, and no
participant reached more than 20 correct choices (= 5%-cut-off
of the chance distribution) in the forced-choice test.
The mean number of correct answers given in the attention
task during the masking sequence of the experiment was high
(M = 94.9%; SD= 5.8%). This high accuracy indicates that par-
ticipants had visually ﬁxated the screen center and were closely
attending to subliminal stimulations.
In the experimental version with suprathreshold encoding pairs,
participants gave more ﬁt answers to analogs (M = 47.9%,
SD= 14.6%) than broken analogs (M = 41.4%, SD= 12.3%),
t (34)= 2.29, p = 0.029, r2 = 0.133. This result suggests that con-
ceptual associations had been established between the words dur-
ing incidental encoding and biased the subjective sense of the
semantic relatedness of words contained in the analogs given for
retrieval. Hence, the encoded associations between words must
have been semantic andwere expressed ﬂexibly in the new retrieval
context.
The same result occurred for the two subliminal versions of the
experiment. We computed a repeated-measures analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with the within-subjects factors Encoding Inten-
sity (one versus nine subliminal encoding trials) and Retrieval
Condition (analogs versus broken analogs), and with the between-
subjects factor Sequence (suprathreshold version ﬁrst versus sub-
liminal versions ﬁrst). The dependent variable was the percentage
of ﬁt answers. The interaction of Sequence ×Retrieval Condi-
tion was signiﬁcant, F(1, 33)= 5.57, p = 0.024, η2p = 0.171 while
the main effect of Retrieval Condition was not, F(1, 33)= 2.49,
p = 0.124, η2p = 0.083. Post hoc t -tests revealed that analogs
received more ﬁt answers (M = 42.5%, SD= 8.5%) than bro-
ken analogs (M = 35.5%, SD= 9.5%), t (16)= 2.68, p = 0.016,
r2 = 0.310, if the suprathreshold version preceded the two sublim-
inal versions of the experiment (Figure 3A). If the session started
with a subliminal version, participants gave a statistically equal
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FIGURE 3 | Results of experiment 1 and 2. In both experiments,
participants gave more ﬁt answers to analogs than broken analogs
following unconscious paired-associative encoding of subliminal word pairs.
(A)This effect occurred if participants acquired a task-set in an initial run
with suprathreshold presentations of encoding stimuli. (B) An important
aspect of acquiring the relevant task-set was gaining insight into the
conceptual relation between encoding word pairs and retrieval word pairs.
M, mean; SEM, standard error of the mean.
percentage of ﬁt answers to analogs (M = 40.1%, SD= 12.1%)
and broken analogs (M = 41.5%, SD= 8.1%), t (17)=−0.57,
p = 0.572, r2 = 0.018. The suprathreshold experimental version
had apparently informed participants of the task structure and
conﬁgured their expectations and cognitive processes for the sub-
liminal task. We refer to this conﬁguration of cognitive processes
as an installation of a task-set (Monsell, 2003). Because the same
kind of cognitive processing is required by the suprathreshold
and the subliminal versions of the experiment, the task-set that
was already installed during the suprathreshold experiment was
maintained and beneﬁted the performance in the subliminal
experimental versions. Importantly, different sets of words were
used for the three experimental versions. Therefore, the effect of
the initial supraliminal experimental version cannot reﬂect word
priming.
The non-signiﬁcant interaction of Encoding Intensity with
Retrieval Condition, F(1, 33)= 0.12, p = 0.728 η2p = 0.002, indi-
cated that the ninefold and one-time subliminal encoding were
equivalent in terms of unconscious retrieval performance. The
percentage of ﬁt answers was comparable for analogs presented
in the experimental version with one encoding trial (M = 43.4%,
SD= 10.6%) and nine encoding trials (M = 44.3%, SD= 13.2%).
Also the percentage of ﬁt answers to broken analogs was com-
parable between the experimental version with one encoding trial
(M = 41.1%,SD= 11.94%) and nine encoding trials (M = 41.4%,
SD= 13.0%).
A further method (Greenwald et al., 1995) to establish claims
of unconscious processing entails the regression of the discrim-
ination performance achieved in the direct awareness test (per-
centage of correct minus percentage of incorrect answers) onto
the performance achieved in the indirect retrieval test applied
in the experiment (percentage of ﬁt answers given to analogs
minus percentage of ﬁt answers given to broken analogs during
the subliminal versions of the experiment). A claim of uncon-
scious processing is considered justiﬁed if the y-axis intercept
is signiﬁcantly different from zero. This result indicates that
unconscious processing persists even if potential contributions
by conscious stimulus discrimination are regressed out. We com-
puted a regression analysis for the group of participants who
had started with the suprathreshold version of the experiment
and who showed an effect of subliminal stimulus processing.
The y-axis intercept (0.057, SE= 0.021) was signiﬁcantly greater
than zero [t (16)= 2.668, p = 0.018]. This indicates that effects
of subliminal perception persisted even if potential contributions
of conscious stimulus discrimination were excluded. The slope
(B =−0.235, SE= 0.101, β=−0.514) was also signiﬁcant show-
ing an inverse relationship [t (16)=−2.323, p = 0.035]. The slope
of the regression and the distribution of participants above and
below the zero line of the x-axis (Figure 4A) indicate that the
worse stimulus discriminability was in the awareness test, the
better was implicit retrieval performance in the experiment. If
anything, conscious stimulus discriminability in the experiment
might have counteracted unconscious paired-associative encoding
and retrieval.
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of the ﬁrst experiment suggested that the ﬂexible
expression of unconsciously acquired memories can be achieved,
if participants are given the chance to get familiar with the task
structure during an initial suprathreshold version of the task. The
second experiment was conducted to ﬁnd out whether a critical
aspect of the beneﬁcial effect of the initial suprathreshold run is
the awareness of the conceptual connection between study word
pairs (e.g., “table–car”) and test word pairs (e.g., “desk–bus”).
Furthermore, we were interested in replicating the ﬁnding that
a single subliminal encoding trial was sufﬁcient to bias the subjec-
tive sense of semantic relatedness of words in analogs presented at
retrieval.
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FIGURE 4 | Regression of awareness test performance onto retrieval
performance.The measure of discrimination performance was the
difference between the percentage of correct answers and the percentage
of incorrect answers given in the awareness test. The measure of retrieval
performance in the experiments was the difference between the
percentage of “ﬁt” answers given to analogs versus broken analogs. (A)
Experiment 1. Discrimination performance was regressed onto retrieval
performance using the data from participants who took the suprathreshold
version ﬁrst. The signiﬁcant size of the y -axis intercept indicates that the
retrieval effect persists when potential contributions of conscious stimulus
discrimination are excluded.The slope of the regression was also signiﬁcant
showing an inverse relationship. The slope and the distribution of
participants above and below the zero line of the x -axis indicate that the
worse stimulus discriminability was in the awareness test, the better was
retrieval performance in the experiment. Hence, conscious stimulus
discriminability might have counteracted unconscious paired-associative
encoding and retrieval. (B) Experiment 2. Discrimination performance was
regressed onto retrieval performance using the data from the subjects who
had gained insight into the task principle during the initial suprathreshold
version of experiment 2.The signiﬁcant size of the y -axis intercept indicates
that the retrieval effect persists when potential contributions of conscious
stimulus discrimination are excluded.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-six new participants (18 women and 18 men; age range:
20–34 years; M = 25.11, SD= 2.96) took part in experiment 2
for remuneration or course credit. Participants were normally
sighted native German speakers, reported no current or past neu-
rological or psychiatric disorders, and denied taking prescription
or illegal drugs. Participants were kept naïve as to the pur-
pose of the experiment (subliminal perception and memory).
They were misinformed that the subliminal experimental ver-
sions were about attention (encoding part) and language (retrieval
part).
Design and procedure
Design and procedure were identical to experiment 1 with three
exceptions: (a) All participants performed the suprathreshold
experimental version ﬁrst, followed by two subliminal runs with (b)
each a single encoding trial per word pair. (c) Interviews following
the suprathreshold experiment assessed whether participants were
aware of conceptual connections between encoding word pairs and
analogs (e.g., that “table–car” was presented at encoding and the
related word pair “desk–bus” at retrieval). We hypothesized that
the insight into this conceptual connection between study and test
word pairs was the relevant aspect in framing participants’ task-
set for the subsequent unconscious processing of subliminal word
pairs.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Fifteen of 36 participants had noticed the conceptual correspon-
dence between at least one encoding word pair and one retrieval
word pair (e.g., “table–car” followed by “desk–bus”). We consid-
ered these 15 participants to have gained insight into the task
structure.
No participant reported to have suspected or perceived sub-
liminal stimuli during the experiment. The group analysis of
the data from the awareness test yielded a non-signiﬁcant result
(M correct = 49.5% SDcorrect = 7.1%), t (35)=−0.362, p = 0.719,
r2 = 0.004, and no participant reached more than 20 correct
choices (= 5%-cut-off of the chance distribution) in the forced-
choice test.
The percentage of correct answers given in the attention
task during the masking sequences of the experiment was high
(M = 91.6%; SD= 9.3%). This high accuracy indicates that par-
ticipants were visually ﬁxating the screen center and were closely
attending to subliminal stimulations.
We computed an ANOVA for the two runs with sublimi-
nal presentations using the percentage of ﬁt answers as depen-
dent variable and including the within-subjects factors Retrieval
Condition (analogs versus broken analogs) and Run (ﬁrst ver-
sus second run). The between-subjects factor was Insight (yes
versus no). There was a signiﬁcant main effect of Retrieval
Condition with analogs receiving more ﬁt answers (M = 35.7%,
SD= 15.1%) thanbroken analogs (M = 32.9%,SD= 14.1%),F(1,
34)= 4.57, p = 0.040,η2p = 0.119, which corroborated the ﬁnding
of experiment 1 of a ﬂexible expression of unconsciously acquired
associations following a single encoding trial. This main effect
was driven by the variable Insight, as indicated by the interac-
tion of Retrieval Condition × Insight, F(1, 34)= 5.84, p = 0.021,
www.frontiersin.org November 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 343 | 7
Reber and Henke Memories of subliminal word pairs
η2p = 0.147 (Figure 3B). Post hoc t -tests revealed that participants
who had gained insight into the conceptual correspondence
between encoding word pairs and test word pairs during the initial
suprathreshold run gave more ﬁt answers to analogs (M = 40.8%,
SD= 14.8%) than broken analogs (M = 33.5%,SD= 15.0%) dur-
ing the subliminal runs [t (14)= 2.95, p = 0.011, r2 = 0.383]. In
contrast, subjects who gained no insight gave an equal number
of ﬁt answers to analogs (M = 31.9%, SD= 14.5%) and broken
analogs (M = 32.4%, SD= 13.6%) during the subliminal runs
[t (20)=−0.218, p = 0.830, r2 = 0.002].
We computed a regression analysis using the performance on
the awareness test (percentage of correct answersminus percentage
of incorrect answers) as predictor and the performance achieved
in the indirect retrieval test as criterion (percentage of ﬁt answers
to analogs minus percentage of ﬁt answers to broken analogs;
Greenwald et al., 1995). The group of participants who had gained
insight into the relationship between encoding and retrieval word
pairs during the initial suprathreshold version of the experiment
and who had shown signiﬁcant effects of subliminal perception
yielded an y-axis intercept (0.042, SE= 0.013) signiﬁcantly greater
than zero [t (14)= 3.151, p = 0.008]. This indicates that effects
of subliminal perception persisted even if potential contribu-
tions of conscious stimulus discrimination were excluded. The
slope (B =−0.149, SE= 0.139, β=−0.286) was not signiﬁcant
[t (14)=−1.075, p = 0.302; Figure 4B] suggesting that conscious
stimulus discriminability as assessed in the awareness test was
unrelated to implicit retrieval performance as measured in the
experiment.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We examined whether unconscious information processing
exhibits computational characteristics of episodic memory,
namely encoding in one single trial (McClelland et al., 1995;
O’Reilly and Rudy, 2000, 2001; Norman and O’Reilly, 2003),
new association formation (Squire, 1992; Cohen and Eichen-
baum, 1993; Rolls and Treves, 1998; O’Reilly and Rudy, 2000,
2001; Norman and O’Reilly, 2003), and representational ﬂexibility
(Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Frank et al., 2003). In both exper-
iments, the subjective semantic distance between retrieval words
was judged smaller if semantic neighbors of retrieval words had
been presented subliminally side-by-side rather than combined
with another word. Thus, even though retrieval words differed
from encoding words, their mere analogy to concepts combined
in encoding pairs decreased their perceived semantic distance.
This result suggests a ﬂexible expression of unconsciously acquired
semantic word–word associations. One subliminal encoding trial
was sufﬁcient for participants to encode new semantic associa-
tions between subliminal words. There was no statistically sig-
niﬁcant increase in retrieval performance when encoding word
pairs were presented in nine instead of one encoding trial. These
ﬁndings indicate that unconscious associative encoding can be
very rapid (McClelland et al., 1995; O’Reilly and Rudy, 2000,
2001; Norman and O’Reilly, 2003). Furthermore, retrieval effects
in both experiments appeared following a study–test interval of
5 min. Hence, memories of subliminal words may outlast many
minutes exceeding short-term and entering long-term memory
storage (Shiffrin and Atkinson, 1969). These effects of subliminal
stimulus processing depended on an initial understanding of the
task structure.
A contamination of unconscious encoding by the conscious
perception of subliminal words or fragments thereof is unlikely
because the post-experimental interview and the awareness test
conﬁrmed the absence of a conscious access to subliminal words.
Although the number of trials (30 trials) in the awareness test
was rather small, we consider a conscious contamination of the
experimental effects improbable because participants’ discrimina-
tion performance in the awareness test was neither above chance
level (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984) nor positively related to per-
formance on the implicit retrieval test given in the experiment
(Greenwald et al., 1995). Even if potential contributions by con-
scious stimulus perception existed, the experimental effects of
encoding and retrieval persisted when such contributions were
regressed out (Greenwald et al., 1995).
An interesting ﬁnding was that only those participants who
had acquired some understanding of the task structure during an
initial suprathreshold task version generated the reported effects
of unconscious associative encoding and retrieval. Because the
suprathreshold version contained other stimuli than those pre-
sented in the subliminal runs, the suprathreshold version did not
prime subliminal words. Instead, the suprathreshold run allowed
participants to gain insight into the conceptual analogy between
encoding word pairs (table–car) and retrieval word pairs (desk–
bus). This insight into the task structure had apparently installed
a task-set (Monsell, 2003) that was steering the processing of the
subliminal word pairs (see also Martens and Kiefer, 2009). The
necessity of installing a task-set by way of conscious processing for
successful unconscious memory formation does not question the
participants’ unawareness of encoding stimuli and their unaware-
ness of the formed memories that guided their choices at test.
Although the abstract task principles were available to conscious-
ness, the speciﬁc learning material and the formed memories were
not. In fact, several studies revealed that the processing of sublim-
inal information is under intentional control, rather than auto-
matic (Naccache and Dehaene, 2001; Abrams et al., 2002; Kunde
et al., 2003; Dehaene et al., 2006; Eckstein and Perrig, 2007; Kiesel
et al., 2009; Martens and Kiefer, 2009; Kiefer and Martens, 2010).
For example, Eckstein and Perrig (2007) found that the intention
to classify the same words with respect to different semantic cate-
gories had a differential effect on measures of subliminal priming.
Priming varied with the instructed semantic category in all exper-
iments. Furthermore, a semantic versus perceptual induction task
could activate a semantic or perceptual task-set and therebymodu-
late the sort of the subliminal priming effects (Martens and Kiefer,
2009; Kiefer and Martens, 2010). These and the current ﬁndings
suggest that the processing of subliminal stimuli is facilitated by
the previous built-up of speciﬁc expectations and the sensitization
of the task-speciﬁc processing pathways. It appears that cognitive
control can constrain both conscious and unconscious stimulus
processing.
A crucial difference between the present experiments and other
subliminal priming studies, such as those cited above (Kiesel et al.,
2009; Martens and Kiefer, 2009; Kiefer and Martens, 2010), exists
with respect to the nature of the formed memory representa-
tions and their duration over time. Subliminal semantic priming
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has mostly been accounted for in terms of short-lived prospec-
tive or preparatory processing initiated by the prime (Foster and
Davis, 1984; Greenwald et al., 1996; Bowers, 2003; Kouider and
Dehaene, 2007), such as spreading activation (Collins and Loftus,
1975). Spreading activation is short-lived and therefore cannot
explain our subliminal effects that survived a study–test interval
of several minutes in the current and past experiments (Henke
et al., 2003; Duss et al., 2011). A retrospective account (Masson
and Bodner, 2003) appears more appropriate for such ﬁndings
because the retrospective account postulates that a prime estab-
lishes amemory trace throughneuroplastic changes – e.g., induced
by long-term potentiation – that beneﬁt the later processing of the
target. The long retention period brings our results into the realm
of long-term memory and suggests this terminology (“encoding”
and“retrieval”) rather than the priming terminology (“prime”and
“target”).
The feasibility of rapid associative encoding and retrieval of
word pairs without consciousness of retrieval has also been inves-
tigated with suprathreshold word presentations at both encoding
and retrieval and with implicit (i.e., indirect) retrieval instruc-
tions. These studies included healthy participants and patients
with amnesia. Graf and Schacter (1985) had amnesic patients and
healthy control participants study pairs of unrelatedwords, such as
“window–reason,” in a single encoding trial. For retrieval, partic-
ipants were presented with cues, such as “window-rea. . .,” or new
word combinations, such as “kitchen-rea. . .” (kitchen was com-
bined with another word for study). Participants were required to
produce the ﬁrst word that came to mind as a completion of the
word stem. The word stem was expected to be more often com-
pleted with the study word when old instead of recombined pairs
were presented. This result would speak for an implicit retrieval of
the word–word association. Indeed, controls and amnesic patients
exhibited implicit memory for the studied word pairs following
a semantic encoding of word pairs. Importantly, implicit mem-
ory for the new associations occurred independently of the level
of explicit remembering. Similar implicit–explicit dissociations
were found in memory-impaired patients of various etiologies
using veriﬁcation tasks such as identiﬁcation of old versus recom-
bined word pairs (Gabrieli et al., 1997), reading time for old versus
recombined word pairs (Moscovitch et al., 1986), and lexical deci-
sion for old versus recombined word pairs (Goshen-Gottstein
et al., 2000). When Schacter and Graf (1986) reanalyzed their
original data (Graf and Schacter, 1985) and added new data,
they found that the acquisition and unconscious retrieval of new
word–word associations following semantic study was intact in
mildly to moderately memory-impaired patients, but impaired in
severely memory-impaired patients. Perhaps this and other results
(Shimamura and Squire, 1989) can be explained by the depen-
dence of unconscious association formation on the hippocampus
and related structures. While conscious association formation
might require the processing within a large hippocampal network,
unconscious association formation might recruit a smaller neural
population and therefore be intact in patients with mild amnesia
due to only partial tissue damage. However, even for unconscious
association formation a critical minimal amount of intact hip-
pocampal tissue might be required for successful associative pro-
cessing, which might not have been the case in severely memory-
impaired patients. In fact, evidence is accumulating that both con-
scious and unconscious rapid associative encoding and retrieval
are impaired in severely amnesic patients with hippocampal dam-
age.One-trial associative encoding and retrievalwith different pre-
sentation formats at study and test requiring a ﬂexible representa-
tion in memory was impaired in amnesic patients when encoding
and retrieval were implicit, i.e., not directly instructed (Rajaram
and Coslett, 2000a,b; Ryan et al., 2000; Verfaellie et al., 2006; Han-
nula et al., 2007). On the other hand, implicit single item encoding
and retrieval remained intact in the same patients. This evidence
suggests that processing features considered typical of episodic
memory, namely a rapid associative encoding and a ﬂexible
retrieval, require hippocampal processing even if implicitly tested.
While the above results are suggesting that rapid associative
encoding and ﬂexible retrieval require hippocampal processing
even if implicitly tested, our current results suggest that the
same processing features are operational in healthy participants
even if consciousness of both encoding and retrieval is securely
excluded. Because speed of encoding, long-term retention, asso-
ciativity, and representational ﬂexibility are key features of episodic
memory, operate with and without consciousness, and apparently
require hippocampal processing, the question arises whether con-
sciousness of encoding and retrieval is a necessary condition for
episodic memory formation and expression (Henke, 2010). How-
ever, the where and when of happenings is an integral part of
episodic memories (Tulving, 1985, 2001) and a ﬁrm claim of an
unconscious form of episodic memory must await evidence of
the unconscious formation of what–where–when memories (Tul-
ving, 1985, 2001). Future research on unconscious association
formation might beneﬁt from excluding the contamination of
unconscious by conscious processes when presenting the encoding
material subliminally. Research on unconscious processing might
also beneﬁt from installing an appropriate task-set before experi-
mentation. The use of neuroimaging methods will reveal to what
extent neural networks underlying unconscious and conscious
associative encoding/retrieval overlap.
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APPENDIX
POST-EXPERIMENTAL INTERVIEW
Remember the two parts of the experiment in which you saw black
and white dot patterns and you performed the attention task. Did
you notice anything else than the black and white dot patterns or
did you notice any regularity within these dot patterns?
If participant answers “yes” to the above question:
Describe what you saw:
Did you see it clearly?
How big was it?
Where on the screen did you see it?
Did you see this always or just sometimes?
In case you saw it only sporadically, when and how often did
you see it?
Questions and information for all participants:
Did you potentially see contours of letters or the contour of a
word?
Words were presented very brieﬂy – for 17 ms – between the
black and white dot patterns. Now that you know this, do you
think that you sometimes had a hunch of letters or words?
If yes, where exactly did you see the letters or words? How large
were they?
In fact, we presented words to the left and right of the ﬁxation
cross and they spanned nearly the full width of the screen. Now
that you know all this, do you think you could see any aspect of
words?
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